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In general, models in finance assume that  investors are risk averse. An example of such a recent 
model is the pioneering work of Aumann and Serrano, which presents an economic index of riskiness of 
gambles  which  is  independent  of  wealth  and  holds  (as  might  be  understood  from  the  adjective 
“economic”)  for  exclusively  risk  averse  investors.  In  their  paper,  they  discuss  gambles  with  positive 
expected returns which will be accepted or rejected by agents which different levels of risk aversion. The 
question never asked by the authors (and in most of the finance literature) is: Who is offering these 
attractive gambles? To arrive at an answer, we extend the Aumann-Serrano risk index in such a way that it 
accommodates gambles with either positive or negative expectations and is thus suitable for both the risk 
averse and risk lovers.  Once we allow for the existence of risk lovers, it may be shown that in financial 
markets, many gambles with negative expectations are taken either knowingly or unknowingly so that 
there are always people that act as if they are risk lovers. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of 
the implications of our result, in particular that gambling is by no means restricted to the casino or the 
track. 




The  current  financial  crisis  has  raised  many  questions  surrounding  the  arguably 
excessive risks taken by various agents in financial markets in recent years. After all, it is not 
often that banks the size of Bear Stearns and Lehmann Brothers go under in the absence of even 
a  rush  on  banks.  And  part  of  the  problem  is  surely  the  cognitive  dissonance  that  has 
accompanied the crash. This reaction is largely due to the fact that gambling is supposed to be 
carried  out  in  casinos  and  at  the  track,  while  investment  goes  on  in  the  stock,  commodity, 
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agents are risk averse. An agent is generally defined as risk averse if she would not accept any 
gamble with zero or negative expected return. And gambles are generally defined as sums or 
distributions of the products of possible outcomes and the probabilities of their occurrence at a 
given  time.  And  presumably,  were  investors  provided  with  accurate  expected  returns  of  all 
gambles offered them in any given market, the vast majority may well demonstrate risk averse 
behavior, although this turns out to be an empirically un-testable hypothesis. The purpose of this 
paper is to demonstrate that, as soon as the existence of risk loving agents is permitted in theory, 
most of the financial markets we know today must contain them in practice. 
We do so by showing that for  well-defined gambles which are independent of other 
gambles, if one of the agents (either the one taking or the one offering the gamble) is risk averse, 
the other must be risk loving. Either that, or both are risk neutral. We call this the Theorem of 
Risk Balance. But if this is so, why do these markets exist and flourish? We begin with one 
obvious answer which need not be dealt with further in this paper: In many organizations which 
provide agents for financial markets, the incentive structure may not be consistent with risk 
averse transactions. Thus, the employee receives a large bonus if his risky bet wins while the risk 
averse owner of the firm foots the bill if it does not. The rogue traders who have made front page 
news during the past decade are merely extreme examples, inter alia, of this phenomenon at 
work. Less dramatically, in most cases of managed funds known to the authors, the manager 
shares in profits from investment (if not also the principle) and does not share in losses. 
More important for our purposes is the fact that objective probabilities of outcomes are 
almost never known in any financial markets (casinos and perhaps lotteries being the ironic 
exceptions) and the outcomes themselves are rarely known. Thus, if Mary buys a stock today she 
has no idea what it might be worth next Monday let alone what probabilities to attach to various 
possible outcomes. And if John sells an option today, he knows that he can gain at most the 
premium from the sale but has no way to calculate expected losses. This, of course, follows 
directly from the assumed absence of free lunches in economics.  In this case, market agents 
suffer from false consciousness because, believe as they may that they are risk averse they have 
no way to accept or reject this hypothesis. 
But there is an alternative story that must be considered. Perhaps many participants in 
financial markets are knowingly risk lovers! In other words, in preference to casinos and the 
track, they prefer the higher risk gambles offered by, for example, selling naked options. This is 
an alternative ruled out by academics in economics and finance, perhaps because they truly 
believe that no one could possibly be risk loving, or could it be that they simply prefer the calculus of “well-behaved” concave utility functions in their modeling? Either way, in this case, 
false consciousness would reside in the ivory tower. 
A  modern  text  demonstrates  the  problem  well:
2  To  determine  whether  s tudents 
understand  the  difference  between  speculation  (which  is  presumed  compatible  with  risk 
aversion,  since  speculation,  unlike  gambling,  is  a  socially  acceptable  feature  of  financial 
markets) and gambling (risk loving behavior and a “bad” thing), they are asked whether a US 
investor who faces exchange rate risk when buying UK T-bills is engaged in speculation or 
gambling. The last two sentences of their answer – after explaining what is involved in the 
mechanics  of  the  trade  –  are:  Therefore,  if  the  investor  expects  favorable  exchange  rate 
movements, the UK bill is a speculative investment. Otherwise, it is a gamble. But, of course, 
nowhere  in  the  remaining  nine  hundred-plus  pages  of  the  book,  where  gambling  is  never 
mentioned  again,  are students  informed  how  to  calculate expected  returns  from  investments 
involving exchange rate risk and thus there is no way of applying this tautology in the real 
world. And they are not informed because the authors know well that according to financial 
theory there is no knowable way to predict movements in foreign exchange with any accuracy.  
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we take the economic model of riskiness 
developed by Aumann and Serrano, 2007 (hereafter AS) and extend it to permit the existence of 
risk lovers. Our purpose is to discover whether there is a connection between risk averse and risk 
loving traders in financial markets once such a connection is no longer a priori ruled out as by 
AS and most other authors. We shall show that once the index is generalized it does indeed 
suggest a compelling connection between risk averse and risk loving traders. We call this result 
the Theorem of Risk Balance and conclude the paper with a brief discussion of its meaning and 
application to real financial markets. 
 




3,  we  introduce  and  discuss  the  notion  of   a  generalized  index  of 
economic riskiness, with no a priori assumptions about attitudes toward risk. A utility function is 
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 For an alternative approach to the derivation of the [AS] index, see Hart (2008).   a strictly monotonic twice continuously differentiable function  u  defined over the entire line. 
We normalize u  so that  
  (0)=0 and (0)=1 uu    (1) 
     
 If u  is concave then an agent with a utility function u  is risk averse, while if u  is convex, then 
an agent with a utility function u  is risk lover. 
The following definition is due to Arrow (1965 and 1971) and Pratt (1964):  
 
Definition 1.1 The coefficient of absolute risk of an agent i  with utility function  i u  and 
wealth w is given by:  
  ) ( )/ ( = ) , ( = ) ( w u w u u w w i i i i i        
 
 Note  ) (x ui  is concave in a neighborhood of  wif and only if  0, > ) (w i   while if it is 
convex if and only if  0. < ) (w i   
Along the lines of [AS, Lemma 2,3] we show : 
 
Lemma 1.2  Let agents  i  and  j  have  normalized  utility  functions  i u  and  j u  and 
Arrow-Pratt coefficients  i   and  j   of absolute risk aversion. Then    
    1.  For each  0, >   suppose that  ) ( > ) ( w w j i    at each  w with  . |< |  w  Then 
) ( < ) ( w u w u j i  whenever  . |< | 0  w    
    2.  If  ) ( ) ( w w j i     for all  , w  then  ) ( ) ( w u w u j i   for all  . w    
 Proof. 1. Let  . |< |  y  If  0 > y . Then by (1),  
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 If  0 < y   then  the  inequality  is  reversed  by  the  same  arguments.  Thus ,  ) ( ln ) ( ln
>
< y u y u j i    
whenever  0,
>
< y  so also  ) ( ) (
>
< y u y u j i    whenever  0.
>
< y  So if  0 > w  then by (1)  
  ) ( = ) ( < ) ( = ) (




i      and similarly by using the reverse signs, when  0. < w   
2. In parallel to the first part, with i  and  j  interchanged, strict inequalities are replaced 
by weak inequalities and the restriction to   |< |w  is eliminated.     QED 
 
Let agent i  have utility function  , i u  and let w be a real number. We say that i  accepts 
g  at  w if  ), ( > ) ( w u g w Eu i i   where  E  stands for ``expectation'', otherwise, i  rejects  g  at 
. w   We show:  
 
Proposition 1.3  Let agents  i  and  j  have normalized utility functions  i u  and  j u  and 
Arrow-Pratt coefficients  i   and  j   of absolute risk aversion. If  ) ( > ) ( j j i i w w    then there is 
a gamble  g  that  j  accepts at  j w  and i  rejects at  . i w   
  
Proof. Without loss of generality assume  0, = = j i w w  so  (0). > (0) j i    Since  i u  and 
j u  are twice continuously differentiable it follows that there is a  0 >   so that  ) ( > ) ( w w j i    
for all  . |< |  w  Moreover, for   small enough  i u  and  j u  are each either concave or convex in 
the interval  ). , (     It follows from Def.1.1 that if  j u  is concave then  0 > ) ( > ) ( w w j i    and 
so  i u  is concave as well, and if  i u  is convex so is  . j u  Now, by Lemma 1.2.1,  
   
  ( ) < ( ) whenever 0 | |< ij u w u w w     (2) 
   
 (I) Assume first that  j u  is concave. Choose   with  /2. 0      For     x 0  and  , , = j i k  
set  






:= ) (      x u x u x f k k k  
By (2),  
  ( ) < ( ) forall  ij f x f x x  (3) 
By (3), concavity of  j u , and (1),  
  0. = (0) < (0) < (0) j j i u f f  On the other hand, by monotonicity of the utilities,  






= ) ( i i i u u f    
Since  i f  is continuous, it follows that  0 = ) (y fi  for some   < < 0 y  and so by (3),  0. > ) (y f j  
So if  0 >   is sufficiently small then  0 >   y  and  
  ) ( < 0 < ) (     y f y f j i  
Let  g  be the half-half gamble yielding       y  or      y  Then  
  ) ( = ) ( < 0 < ) ( = ) ( g Eu y f y f g Eu j j i i      
Hence  j  accepts  g  at 0  while i  rejects it. 
(II) Now assume that  i u  is convex. For  , , = j i k  define  k u ~  by  
  ) ( = ) ( ~ x u x u k k    
Then  
(0) =0, ' ( ) = ( ) >0, ' (0) =1and   " ( ) = ( ). k k k k u u x u x u u x u x ¢ ¢ ¢ - - - % % % %  
Moreover, by (2),  
   |< | 0 whenever ) ( ~ < ) ( ~ w w u w u i j   
Since  i u ~  is concave in the interval  ), , (     we are in the same situation as in (I), with i  and  j  
interchanged, thus there is a gamble  g  so that  
  ) ( ~ < 0 < ) ( ~ g u E g u E i j  
Take the gamble  , g   then  
  ) ( = ) ( ~ < 0 < ) ( ~ = ) ( g Eu g u E g u E g Eu j j i i      
Hence  j  accepts  g   at 0  while i  rejects it. 
(III) Finally assume  i u  is concave and  j u  is convex. This case is the simplest. Let  g  be 
the half-half gamble yielding     or  . Then  
  ) ( < 0 < ) ( g Eu g Eu j i  
Thus i  rejects  g  and  j  accepts it. 
For arbitrary  i w and j w , define  ) (x ui  by  ) (
*
i i w x u   and  ) ( = ) (
*
j j j w x u x u   and apply 
the following to 
*
i u  and 
*
j u .   QED 
 Definition 1.4  Call i  at least risk averse or no more risk loving than  j  (written  j i ) 
if for all levels  i w  and  j w  of wealth,  j  accepts at  j w  any gamble that i  accepts at  . i w  Call i  
more risk averse or less risk loving than  j  (written  ) j i  if  j i  and  . i j
4  
 
As a corollary of Prop.1.3 we have:  
 
Corollary 1.5  Given agents i  and  , j  then  
  ( ) ( ) i i j j i j w w rr >  
for all  i w  and  . j w   
  
Proof. Assume  ij >  and  assume  there  are  i w  and  j w  with  ). ( < ) ( j j i i w w    By 
Prop.1.3,  there  is  a  gamble  g   that  i   accepts  and  j   rejects,  a  contradiction.  So 
) ( ) ( j j i i w w     for all  . , j i w w  
Assume now  ) ( ) ( j j i i w w     for all  . , j i w w  We wish to show that for all  i w  and  j w  
and any gamble  , g  if i  accepts  g  at  i w  then  j  accepts  g  at  . j w  Without loss of generality 
assume  0. = = j i w w  Then Lemma 1.2.2 with i  and  j  interchanged implies  ) ( ) ( w u w u i j   for 
all  . w  Hence  ) ( ) ( g Eu g Eu i j   for all  g  implying the desired result.  QED 
 
Definition 1.6  An agent is said to have Constant Absolute Risk (CAR) utility function if 



















 If  0 >   then the agent is risk-averse with a CARA utility function, while if  0 <   
then the agent is risk-loving with a CARL - Constant Absolute Risk-Loving - utility function . If 
0 =   then the agent is risk neutral. The notion of ``CAR'' is justified since for any  ,   the 
coefficient of absolute risk    defined in Def.1.1, satisfies    = ) (w  for all  , w  that is, the 
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 Note that in [AS] the above is defined for risk averse agents only, and is denoted by ``i  is at least as risk averse as  j ''. Arrow-Pratt  coefficient is a constant that does not depend on  . w  We  have  thus  a  sheaf  of 
functions   u  satisfying for all x:  
  ( )is continuous at =0. ux    
                      To see this, we need to show that for all  0 , ( ) = , lim x u x x a a ®  where we consider 
the two sided limit. Now, if  0 = x  then for all  , ( )= u x x a a  and if  0  x  then  
  x xe e














                    Given any  ,   observe that  
  ( ) = ( ) Eu g Eu g      (4) 
  Indeed, assume  g  results in  } , { 1 n x x   with respective probabilities  . , 1 n p p   Then  
  ) ( = ) (1 ) ( = ) ( = ) (
1 g Eu e p x u p g Eu i x
i i i    

    

    
                  The CARA version of following proposition is proved in [AS, Prop.4.1]. We state 
here the general case.  
 
Proposition 1.7  An agent  i  has CAR utility function if and only if for any gamble g  
and any two wealth levels, i  either accepts  g  at both wealth levels, or rejects  g  at both wealth 
levels.   
Proof. Any CAR utility function   u  accepts  g  if and only if  , >
) ( w w g e Ee
       that 
is if and only if  1 >
g Ee
   which is independent of  . w Conversely, assume an agent i  so that 
) ( < ) ( * * w w i i    for wealth levels  . , * w w  If  0 > ) ( > ) ( * w w i i    then we can follow the proof 
at [AS]. The proof there is based on the formula 
0 ( ) lim( ( ) 1/ 2)/ w p w   
   where  () pw  is 
that p for which  i  is indifferent at  w between taking and not taking the gamble yielding ±δ 
with probabilities p and 1−p respectively. (This formula can be found in e.g. Aumann and Kurz 
(1977), Section 6). It is then used to construct another gamble which is rejected by  i at  w but 
accepted at  *. w  
 If 0 ) (  w i  , then as in 1.3, define  ). ( = ) ( ~ x u x u i i    Then  ) , ~ ( w ui i   is positive and we 
have a gamble  g  accepted at one level and rejected at the other for  . ~
i u  Replacing  g  by  g   
concludes the proof for this case. If  ) ( < 0 < ) ( * w w i i    then for   small enough a half-half gamble resulting     will 
be accepted at  * w  and rejected at  . w   QED 
 
The next theorem verifies the existence of the general index for the following class of 
gambles. A gamble g is gameable if it results in possible losses and possible gains. If g has a 
continuous distribution function, then it is gameable if it is bounded from above and below, that 
is, its distribution function is truncated.     
 
Theorem 1.8  Let  g be a  gameable gamble. Then there exists a unique number  ,   so 
that, for any wealth, a person with utility function   u  is indifferent between taking and not 
taking  . g  In other words, the CAR utility function   u  satisfies for all  , x   
  ). ( = ) ( x u x g Eu     
Moreover,   is positive (negative) if and only if Eg  is positive (resp. negative),  
  
Proof. Define a map  ) ( f  by  
  ( ) =1
g f Ee
 
    (5) 
Since g is gameable it follows first that  () f   is defined for all  ,   and then, since it results 









   
 
Now, 
  ( ) (0)=0 ( ) (0)= ( ) ( )<0 i f ii f Eg iii f      
By  (iii) f is  concave,  hence  has  at  most  two  roots,  one  of  which  is  zero.  If  0 > Eg  then  f 
increases at 0, hence the second root   is positive. If  0 < Eg  then f decreases at 0, hence the 
second root is negative. If  0 = Eg  then  0 =   is the only root. 
To show the last part note that if  0    we have by definition  
  0 = ) (1 = ) (
1 g Ee g Eu

 
    
It follows that for all  , x   
    ) ( = ) (1 = 1 = ) (
1 ) ( 1 x u Ee e Ee g x Eu




          
Also  if  0, =    then  by  the  proof  above  necessarily  0 = Eg   and  so  0 = = ) ( 0 Eg g Eu   and 
). ( = = ) ( 0 0 x u x x g Eu    QED  
Remark    As  pointed  out  by  Schulze  (2008),  [hereafter  Sc],  for  an  unbounded 
distribution function  u(x), the map  () f  is not necessarily defined for all  . (In [Sc, Ex 3] it is 
defined for  0 =   only).  In this case we cannot apply the proof of Th. 1.8. In [Sc] it is shown 
that 
g Ee
   is the Laplace transform of u(x). Since we consider both positive and negative values 
of   ,  we  use  the  two-sided  Laplace  transform.  Thus  () f  is defined for all real   in  the 
region of convergence of u(x). If this region of convergence is wide enough, then the proof is 
still applicable. The question, which distributions admit the appropriate range of convergence, is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Definition 1.9  Given a gamble  , g  denote the number   obtained in Th.1.8 by the 
upper limit of taking  . g   
 Note that if we replace  g  by  Ng  then the upper limit of  Ng  is the corresponding root 
of (5) where  g  is replaced by  , Ng  and thus equals  .
1
 N  
 
Remark 1.10  Given a gamble  g  where  0, > Eg  let its upper limit   be as in Def.1.9. 
Then 
1    is the index of riskiness of  g  as defined in [AS].  
 
The notation upper limit is justified by the following corollary.  
 
Corollary 1.11 Let   be the upper limit of taking a gamble  . g  Then: 
1. If  0 > Eg  then all CARL accept  g  and a CARA person with a utility function   u  
accepts  g  if and only if  
    < < 0  
   2. If  0 < Eg  then all CARA reject  g  and a CARL person with a utility function   u  
accepts  g  if and only if  
  0 < <   
3. If  0 = ) (g E  the all CARA people reject  g  while all CARL people accept  . g  
 Proof. 1. Assume  0 > Eg  and let  . < < 0    Note that for all  , = ( , ) w w ua ar  and 
) , ( =    u w  as defined in Def.1.1. By Lemma 1.2.2,    <  implies  ) ( > ) ( x u x u    for all 
0. > x  Hence by definition of the upper limit  ,    
  0 = (0) = ) ( > ) (    u g Eu g Eu  
This implies that a CARA person with a utility function   u  accepts  . g  Similarly, if    >  then 
a  -CARA person will not accept  . g  
 2. If  0 < Eg  then by Th.1.8,  0, <   and for  0 < <   we have  . < < 0      Since 
0 > ) ( g E   this implies by (4) and part 1:  
  0 = ) ( = ) ( < ) ( = ) ( g Eu g Eu g Eu g Eu            
Hence  0 > ) (g Eu  and a CARL person with a utility function   u  accepts  . g   QED 
 
We  propose  here  a  general  index  of economic riskiness.  Given  a  gamble  g  and  its 
upper limit  ,   define  ) (g Q  by  
  ( ) = Q g e
    (6) 
     
 It is straightforward to check the following properties: 
  
Theorem 1.12  The generalized index  ) (g Q  given in (6) satisfies: 
1.  0 > ) (g Q  for all  . g  
2.  If  0 > Eg   then  1 < ) (g Q   and  if  0 < Eg   then  1. > ) (g Q   When  0 = Eg   then 
1. = ) (g Q  
3.  . ) ( = ) (
1/N g Q Ng Q  In particular  
 
1 ) ( = ) (




Proof. 1. is clear. 2. follows directly from Th.1.8. 
3. By Remark 1.9, the upper limit of taking  Ng  is  ,
1
 N  where   is the upper limit of 
taking  . g  Hence by (7),   
N N g Q e Ng Q
1/ 1
) ( = = ) (






3 Discussion and Conclusions 
Property  3  of  Theorem  1.12    may  be  termed  the  Risk  Balance  Theorem
5  and  its 
implications are simply put: One can think of any financial transaction as someone buying a 
gamble, which at the same time must be sold by someone else. Thus, while one party in the 
transaction faces g, the other faces -g. In any transaction, if buying is very risky, selling must 
have  little  risk,  and  vice  versa.  So  long  as  g  is  not  dependent  upon  other  gambles  (as,  for 
instance, selling a naked call to an agent who does not hold the underlying), one of the agents 
must accept a gamble with negative expected return. The case of transacting an asset of zero 
expected return is also interesting, albeit perhaps less so, as one could argue that buying such an 
asset is not particularly riskier or less risky than selling it. 
At first glance, one might even be tempted to argue that, risk neutral agents aside, half of 
all traders in financial markets must be risk lovers, but this would be to assume that one gamble 
is independent of all others and this is clearly false. Thus, suppose that John sells Mary 1000 
out-of-the-money put options on IBM stock for the end of next year. Suppose further, that John 
somehow knows that his gamble has a positive expected return for the entire period until expiry. 
He is hence accepting a gamble with expected positive return with respect to this trade.  But 
what of Mary? Her trade has a  negative expected return, but does that make Mary a risk lover? 
Not necessarily. If she owns 1000 IBM shares she has simply bought insurance against a sharp 
fall in the market and her overall investment (purchase of  stock and puts) may well have a 
positive expected return, making her risk averse on average.  Accordingly, our result vis a vis 
trades will not be as dramatic as it may seem. But to the extent that most traders in commodity 
markets never take deliver or produce the commodity in which they trade and to the extent that 
most traders in options markets do not hold or sell the underlying asset, our argument carries 
some weight. In other words, throughout the derivation of the risk balance result the implicit 
assumption was made that we are dealing either with a risk lover or a risk averse agent whereas 
                                                            
5 The authors wish to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion and its elaboration. in reality many investors put together a portfolio whose separate elements may have variously 
positive and negative expectations.
6 
Yet this is to assume – as we have done so far – that the parameters of each gamble, the 
payouts and their concomitant probabilities, are known. And while this is true, agents are aware 
of the expectations of different gambles and, if rational
7, will only ever knowingly behave as risk 
lovers. But, in truth, probabilities are almost never known in traditional financial markets and 
payouts only occasionally, so that  traders may be victims of false consciousness, believing 
themselves to be investors (and thus, by definition, risk averse)  while in reality accepting 
gambles with negative returns. 
We are unable to distinguish between these cases since we require well -defined and 
gameable gambles for the derivation of risk balance and thus the question of how many genuine 
risk lovers are to be found in financial markets is ultimately an empirical one. It may, however, 
be safely concluded that the number is far from that assumed in the ivory tower, namely zero. 
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